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Abstract 
The dominant perception is that Irish society has responded to the current eco-
nomic crisis in a relatively muted, moderate and passive fashion. How can we 
explain this apparent absence of political contestation or protest in Irish civil 
society? Various cultural and historical explanations can partially explain this 
apparent passivity; the approach here complements these explanations by ex-
ploring the institutional nature of the Irish state as an explanatory factor for 
the nature of the Irish civil society response to the crisis. Having first defined 
civil society and explored the scale and scope of Irish civil society, the article 
focuses on whether, or to what extent, the relative absence of a progressive civil 
society or movements can be partially attributed to the institutional nature of the 
Irish state. Five institutional or state-centred rationales are offered: the populist 
nature of Irish political parties; patterns of interest group formation; clientalism; 
corporatism; and state strategies to silence dissent. The impact on civil society 
of the increased marketisation of public goods is briefly discussed. The article 
argues that more critical awareness in civil society of how populist state insti-
tutions influence civil society will open up new possibilities for civil society 
strategies. It concludes by examining how institutions, interests and ideas might 
change. Society needs to develop a greater public sphere where cross-sectoral 
progressive alliances can demonstrate popular support for alternatives. 
Key words: Irish civil society, clientalism, marketisation, public sphere, active 
society 
Introduction
Since the current economic crisis took hold, international commentators in The 
Economist, The Wall Street Journal, Vanity Fair and the International Monetary 
Fund congratulated Irish society on its mature response to budget cuts (Lewis 
2011). Back in Ireland, Hardiman (2009) and Byrne (2010) reflected on the 
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 relative passivity of Irish response to the crisis. Others described the Irish re-
sponse as that of an ‘extraordinarily moderate and passive society’ (O’Brien 
2011: 15) and ‘not much more than a long collective whinge’ (Dwyer 2010: 2). 
Mair (2010: 7) describes a ‘passive’ and ‘demobilised’ citizenry. The dominant 
narrative asserts the Irish waited to respond in a ‘pencil revolution’ in the 2011 
General Election where they ejected Fianna Fáil1 and the Green Party from 
office. Cox (2010: 5) contests these assertions of passivity citing numerous ex-
amples of Irish people power to argue that the ‘Irish movement experience is 
different, but it is not less than the western European or the Latin American’. 
Indeed, since 2008 pensioners, students, workers, parents and disadvantaged 
communities have mounted various local and national responses to austerity 
and cutbacks and used demonstrations, petitions, meetings, marches and crea-
tive ‘spectacles of defiance’ to register protest. Nonetheless, when compared to 
Iceland’s ‘Saturday Protests’, Spain’s ‘Indignados’ movement and Portugal’s 
‘Desperate Generation’ protests, a sense persists of a relative lack of overt Irish 
protest. This sense is captured in a 2010 Greek protest chant ‘this is Greece, not 
Ireland, we the workers will resist’ (Sheridan 2010). Even if the Irish response 
to the crisis has been less passive than generally asserted, questions nonetheless 
linger. Why has dissent and debate about alternatives had such little impact on 
framing the crisis, championing alternatives or registering protest? What ex-
plains the nature of the Irish response to the crisis and is it possible to imagine 
a different and more effective response? 
The article begins by defining civil society and exploring historical and 
cultural explanations that might explain a relatively passive society. It maps 
recent evidence about the scale, scope and characteristics of Irish civil society 
and levels of political participation, efficacy and trust. It then asks how state-
centred explanations might explain the characteristics, strategies and practices 
of contemporary Irish civil society. In particular it examines how populist po-
litical parties relate to civil society; how institutions of the Irish state impact 
on patterns of interest group formation; how clientalism and localism work to 
politically neutralise civil society actors; how corporatism leads to co-option; 
how strategies of state capture and control silence dissent and finally whether 
marketisation of public goods creates new challenges for Irish civil society. It 
concludes by exploring strategies to challenge that culture.
Defining civil society 
The notion of civil society is problematic conceptually and is a contested field 
of meanings (Chambers and Kapstein 2006; Taylor 2006; Roginsky and Shortall 
2009). The approach taken here mirrors Cohen and Arato’s where civil society 
is defined as ‘a sphere of social interaction between economy and state’ (1992: 
ix). This stresses a Habermasian focus on the public sphere and communica-
tion (Powell and Guerin 1997: 15). Recognising civil society can work as an 
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 oppressive force and arguing against a romantic tendency of seeing civil society 
as a panacea for all, Edwards (2005:6) draws from three traditions in civil society 
literature (Putman’s associational life, the Aristotelian tradition of a normative 
value of a good society and the Habermasian concept of the public sphere) to 
define a concept of civil society as a tripartite relationship of associational activ-
ity, normative values or ideas of a kind of good society and a public sphere in 
which to deliberate and negotiate those outcomes. This definition was used in 
Ireland by the Carnegie Inquiry into Civil Society (2007) and is also consistent 
with Powell and Guerin’s (1997: 25) connection of civil society to generative 
political strategies and Powell’s (2007) later argument for a ‘social left’. 
Polanyi makes a persuasive historical argument that at times of transfor-
mation a dialectical ‘double movement’ from an ‘active society’ works as a 
transformative agent capable of re-embedding an unsustainable commodified 
economy to meet the needs of society (Burawoy 2003). This is consistent with 
Gramsci’s understanding of the role of civil society, both legitimating ruling 
hegemony, but also producing alternative hegemonies. Fox Piven (2008) dem-
onstrates how ‘power from below’ has at times tamed contemporary capitalism. 
While avoiding an argument that progressive civil society is the answer to the 
unfettered power of global neoliberalism (Crouch 2011), the article asks why, 
given the scale of crisis, an Irish alternative or ‘double movement’ has been 
slow to emerge from Irish civil society. Buroway (2003) stresses civil society 
as a specific historical product of European capitalism in the late nineteenth 
century. The distinctive form progressive civil society takes reflects the institu-
tional logic of capitalist arrangement in any one country. Hence, the relationship 
between the state and the market and the national or local political economy is 
crucial in determining the shape of civil society. Roseneil and Williams (2004) 
argue social movements are profoundly shaped by the policy direction of the 
governments they seek to influence, each state actively reframes civil society’s 
political claims, policy demands and public values. 
Explaining Irish civil society 
There are numerous historical and cultural explanations for the nature of Irish 
civil society. Keane (2011) finds reason in the legacy of the crushing defeat of 
the 1798 rebellion and devastation of the 1840s Irish famine. Adshead and Tonge 
(2009: 142) identify Ireland’s peripheral location, and a conservative, peasant, 
land-owning, rural culture as key factors influencing the political culture of Irish 
civil society. Dissent may be dimmed by a broader post-colonial tendency to 
accept authority or by the dominant Catholic Church and its promotion of defer-
ence, victimhood and internalisation of blame and anger. The power of the Irish 
Catholic Church enabled it to maintain a social control role at parish level and 
an oppressive regime in institutionalised education and industrial schools that 
limited Irish social and political development and the likelihood of progressive 
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civil society in Ireland (Inglis 1998). Irish church and state also combined to 
produce a patriarchal socialisation of gender roles; women were pushed into 
private domestic roles and Irish public discourse remains profoundly gendered. 
While other Catholic Church-dominated societies appeared able to shake off 
this repressive legacy, Ireland facilitated continued Church control of education 
and neglected citizenship education (Harris 2005). O’Brien (2011) points to a 
continued ‘weak infrastructure of dissent’ in a historically legitimate Irish state. 
The ‘safety valve’ of emigration certainly helped contain civil dissent about the 
economic and social failures that might otherwise have challenged the legiti-
macy of that state; the fostering of private home ownership did likewise.
In response to colonialism, Ireland developed a nationalism informed by a 
‘religious-ethnic conceptualization of nation’ which reinforced a political cul-
ture associated not with citizenship, but with authoritarianism, conformism 
and loyalty (Adshead and Tonge 2009: 147). The civil war2 political legacy 
meant little ideological or class divide in the historical evolution of Irish politi-
cal parties and ‘a lack of polarisation or ideological conflict’ (Mair 2010: 2). 
The more recent forty years of conflict in Northern Ireland further impacted on 
class politics. Despite extensive early twentieth-century working- class mili-
tancy, mass action, labour activism and the socialist and trade union movement 
(Kostick 1996), and evidence of twentieth-century Irish labour’s political strug-
gle (McGuire 2007), over time the left in Ireland was politically marginal 
(O’Connor 2002) and deeply fragmented. In addition to the civil war legacy, the 
strong presence of an anti-socialist Catholic Church in Irish politics, the absence 
of a strong industrial base, the populist stances of Fianna Fáil and its capacity 
to appeal to the trade union movement, the Labour Party’s internal weaknesses 
and tactical errors, all explain the under development of a large Irish left politi-
cal tradition (Puirséil 2007: 308). Gallagher (1985: 92) argues that the relatively 
cautious and reformist nature of the Irish Labour Party reflected the dominant 
conservative electoral environment, an unsympathetic Church, the prevailing 
constitutional issues and a political culture of consensus that valued individual-
ism over collective or structural action. 
At least some of the above factors can also explain a relative weakness of 
progressive civil society in Ireland. But how have these historical factors had 
such strong legacy and why do they remain so embedded in political and civil 
culture? This article offers state or institutional explanations for the nature of 
Irish civil society and its strategies in response to crisis. Its focus is to fur-
ther explain the nature of Irish civil society by exploring in more depth how it 
is institutionally shaped by a populist state in the historical trajectory of Irish 
state/society/market relationships. It demonstrates how institutions of the state 
embed a particular culture and variety of Irish civil society and actively frame 
civil society responses to the crisis. It also asks how this is changing. 
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Irish civil society, the evidence 
There is compelling evidence about extensive progressive civil society activ-
ity in Irish history (Acheson et al. 2004). Daly (2007) and Adshead and Tonge 
(2009: 139) map an ‘active, large scale and wide spread’ civil society. Connolly 
and Hourigan (2006) map the scale and breadth of social movements in Ireland, 
with Connolly drawing particular attention to the women’s movement. Cox 
(2010: 6) argues that in the 1970s and 1980s Ireland saw massive rates of 
movement participation. Progressive civil society movements include an anti-
capitalist ‘movement of movements’, local environmental activism, gender and 
sexual identity activism, local and community development, equality and anti-
poverty activism and trade union activism (Harvey 1998; O’Connor 2002; Cox 
2006; Murray 2007; Bissett 2009; Leonard 2010). Nonetheless, Meade argues 
‘Ireland is not exactly overburdened with radical media organisation, critical 
networking forums or broadly inclusive social movements’ (2005: 369). What 
does the evidence say?
Ireland is about or above the European average on most indicators of social 
capital, including membership of voluntary or community associations and 
levels of volunteering (NESF 2003). Donoghue et al. (2006) estimated 24,000 
Irish civil society associations primarily focused on the fields of development 
and housing, education and research, sports and recreation, social services and 
arts, culture and heritage. The Taskforce on Active Citizenship (2007) found 
both volunteering and community involvement increased over 2002–06 with 
one-third of adults involved in ‘civic activity’, compared in one in six across 
Europe. However, Donoghue et al. (2006) found only 18.25 per cent of that 
participation engaged in civil rights and advocacy. Mair (2010) found only 2 
per cent of the population are members of political parties (less than the 6 per 
cent European average and third lowest in twenty countries in Western Europe). 
Voter turnout declined from 76 per cent in 1997 to 63 per cent in 2002 (the fifth 
lowest level of election turnout in Western Europe). Ireland is also below aver-
age for trade union density which dropped to 31 per cent at the height of the 
boom and is low relative to other countries (Walsh and Strobel 2009). Irish civil 
activity, while significant, is skewed towards sporting and volunteering activity 
with less advocacy, political activity and party membership, voting or union 
membership. For Mair (2010), this is evidence of a disengaged and passive 
citizenship, but the TASC Democracy Commission (an independent think-tank 
dedicated to combating Ireland’s high level of economic inequality and ensur-
ing that public policy has equality at its core) conclude Irish people, although 
disillusioned and disenchanted, are not disengaged (Harris 2005: 122).
Trust and political participation are closely related. The Taskforce on Active 
Citizenship (2007) reported 38 per cent of citizens as interested in politics 
(either ‘definitely’ or ‘somewhat’) with 54 per cent thinking they could ‘influ-
ence decisions at the local level’. Fahey et al. (2005) analysed confidence in 
political institutions and people’s propensity to participate in political activity 
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and found Ireland broadly consistent with, or above European levels of activity. 
Table 2 shows Irish interest in participation in formal politics to be less than the 
European average, but Irish interest in approved and unapproved protest activity 
above the European average, suggesting an orientation to political contestation. 
Tables 3 and 4 show mixed attitudes to politics, but low levels of both personal 
and institutional efficacy (Garry et al. 2006: 74). Might this low esteem for Irish 
politics and lack of faith in political institutions explain some disengagement?
Table 1: People’s propensity to become engaged in and participate in political 
activity
Ireland (%) Rest of Europe (%)
1 Very/somewhat interested 
in politics
43 46
2 Politics very/quite 
important
32 33
3 Follow politics in the 
news several times a 
week/more
46 71
4 Frequently discuss 
politics
59 73
5 Have/might help political 
party or candidate 
45 – 
6 Have/might sign a 
petition 
84 71
7 Have/might attend lawful 
demonstration
63 60
8 Might join in boycotts 42 41
9 Have/might occupy 
buildings
18 17
10 Have/might unofficial 
strikes
36 26
Source: European Values Study 1999–2000 (Fahey et al. 2005: 203, adapted) 
Table 2: Interest in approved and unapproved political activity 
Ireland (%) Rest of Europe (%)
Interest in politics (1–5 in Table 1) 45 56
Approved political protest (6–8 in Table 1) 63 58
Unapproved political protest (9–10 in Table 1) 27 21
Source: European Values Study 1999–2000 (Fahey et al. 2005: 203, adapted)
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Table 3: Levels of efficacy: percentage of respondents agreeing with following 
statements 
Disagree 
(%)
Neither
(%)
Agree
 (%)
Personal efficacy
Sometimes politics and government seem 
so complicated that a person like me cannot 
really understand what is going on 
33 6 61
I think I am better informed about politics 
and government than most people 
56 17 27
System efficacy
The ordinary person has no influence on 
politics 
40 4 56
It doesn’t matter which political party is in 
power , in the end things go on the same 
25 6 69
In today’s world an Irish government can’t 
really influence what happens in this country 
62 9 28
Source: Irish Social and Political Attitude Survey 2002 (Garry et al. 2006: 66, adapted) 
Table 4: Summary of levels of political alienation 
Alienation dimension %
Low trust 32
Low personal efficacy 41
Low system efficacy 29
Low interest in politics 46
Low knowledge 52
Source: Irish Social and Political Attitude Survey 2002 (Garry et al.2006: 68, adapted)
Explaining underdevelopment of a progressive civil society 
Fahey et al. (2005: 217) argue that political engagement is stimulated by low 
levels of confidence in policy outputs, but undermined by low levels of con-
fidence in political institutions. In the 1980s and 1990s, Irish confidence in 
political institutions and the civil service was high relative to the rest of Europe, 
but recent Eurobarometer and MRBI evidence shows a crisis in public trust in 
political institutions with a fall in confidence levels in the government in the last 
half of 2008 from 46 per cent to 18 per cent and a continual decline to around 10 
per cent (Hardiman 2009). The 2010 Edelman Trust Barometer shows Ireland 
experiencing a profound crisis of trust in the political process, the lowest in 
the twenty-two countries surveyed (Cahalene 2011). We might expect lack of 
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confidence in policy outputs associated with an economic crisis to heighten 
political engagement; however, following Fahey et al. (2005), high levels of 
declining trust in political institutions may reduce the likelihood of such en-
gagement and increase the likelihood of passivity. Can other institutional or 
state-centred explanations illuminate our understanding of these state–society 
relations and add to earlier explanations for the weakness of progressive Irish 
political forces? Acheson et al. (2004: 197) argue that the Irish state plays a key 
role ‘in structuring the civic space in which voluntary action occurs’. State-cen-
tred explanations can run the danger of presenting the ‘state’ as a more coherent 
entity or actor than it really is, can underplay the role of society and the market 
and downplay the role of agency. However, they can at least partially account 
for some characteristics and strategies of Irish civil society. This section ex-
amines five state-centred explanations for this particular form of civil society 
and briefly comments on the changing relationship between state, society and 
market and how increased marketisation of public goods poses new challenges 
for civil society. 
The populist nature of Irish political parties 
Populism as the dominant style of Irish politics has implications for civil so-
ciety. Populist political parties are characterised by their use of and capture 
of intermediate associations and civil society organisations. Civil society and 
social capital, even when strong, can be soured or contaminated by a state domi-
nated by one political party and shaped to meet the needs of that party and state 
(CINEFOGO 2008). The Irish state was a creation of Irish civil society and 
enjoyed the legitimacy of that society (Acheson et al. 2004). The struggle for in-
dependence against the ‘colonial other’ created a perception of a unified society 
and distracted from class and other cleavages and divisions. Irish society was 
subsequently shaped by a weak but controlling state (Pellion 1995) and domi-
nated by a populist political party, Fianna Fáil (FF), in a culture that emphasised 
solidarity, cohesion and homogeneity, but maintained a political discourse that 
is largely non-ideological (Mair 1992). One Party Dominant System (OPDS) 
literature sees the Irish experience of FF as being similar to the Indian, Italian, 
Japanese and Mexican experiences where one party dominated state–society re-
lations (Suttner 2006). These OPDS cultures have in common centrist policies, 
patron-client relations, a tendency to conflate party and state and to reward party 
supporters by appointing them to public positions and a tendency towards bro-
kerage-style politics where people deal with the state, not directly as citizens, 
but through party middlemen. FF’s populist success forced opposition parties to 
try to emulate them so all the main political parties employ relatively populist 
language and tactics, and appeal to national and community interests over class 
ones (Mair 1992: 409). ‘Community’ becomes the language used by parties to 
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express identity values to the Irish electorate and replaces concepts of active 
citizenship or civil society (O’Carroll 2002). 
This combination of strong state legitimacy and populist political culture 
bred a strong, but ‘sour’ Irish social capital as manifested through a number of 
strengths, localism and strong service delivery capacity, but also manifested by 
an absence of conflict, debate and contestation (Kirby and Murphy 2009). This 
state fostered a strong dependence of wide sectors of Irish civil society which 
led to a complex relationship of ‘antipathy and strain … where the needs of mar-
ginalised people are secondary to political concerns’ (Geoghegan and Powell 
2007: 44). Contemporary ‘soft populism’ occurs when political contestation is 
dominated by personality, mass appeal and strong media presence of political 
leaders (Hall 1994). In the aftermath of the crisis there has been a strong stress 
on national unity and appeals for patriotism. This mood marginalises conflict 
and dissent, often at the expense of the more vulnerable. 
Irish state institutions and interest group formation
 The core institutional features of the Irish state manifest themselves in the char-
acteristics, strategies and practices of civil society in contemporary Ireland. A 
highly centralised Irish executive cabinet dominates the bicameral parliament 
(the Oireachtas) consisting of Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann. This central-
ised power combined with a near permanent Fianna Fáil party in power enabled 
the state to maintain a particular strategy in relation to civil society (Cousins 
2005: 123). The populist and incremental development of the Irish welfare state 
also shaped civil society. The special status of the Catholic Church and its his-
torical role in service delivery meant a mixed welfare state. Cousins (2005) and 
Hardiman (1998) highlight the power of the middle class in determining the 
development of a tiered and divided welfare state. Fianna Fáil’s populist and 
pragmatic approach to welfare meant an ad hoc development of contingencies 
for social policy where a wide range of social welfare payments differentiated 
the population. McCashin (2004) notes how the 1986 Commission on Social 
Welfare identified thirty-six types of child social welfare payments reflecting 
the contingency of the parent and whether they were blind, widowed, separated, 
unemployed, injured, etc. The combination of a contingent, divided and mixed 
delivery welfare state with a significant role for voluntary sector service provi-
sion produced in its mirror image, a civil society organised around defending or 
delivering services to these micro-population groups. That some of these sub-
groups were deemed more deserving than others militated against solidarity. 
Despite the populist rhetoric of unity, there was in practice a very fragmented 
and divided civil society. Cox argues that over time increased state reliance led 
to intense sectoral fragmentation (2010: 15). Macro distributional debate and 
imagination are limited when civil society is preoccupied with and organised 
around single-issue micro agendas. 
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Politically neutral civil society actors
Does the institutional design of the Irish electoral system make an active society 
more or less likely? The Irish electoral system has multi-seat constituencies 
ranging from three to five seats decided by Proportional Representation Single 
Transferable Vote (PRSTV).3 Multi-seat constituencies lead to intra-party com-
petition where politicians differentiate themselves through personal brokerage 
relations with the electorate. Thus, the political culture is ‘localistic, clientalistic 
and intensely responsive’ (Boyle 2005: 22) so we can expect protest to be at 
its strongest locally. Keane (2011: 3) argues that local politics is dominated by 
local vote maximisation strategies where ‘local machine politics left little room 
for any tradition of dissent’. This culture enables civil society activists the key 
advantage of access to political elite, but this is mediated through brokerage 
relations. Such a culture is inconsistent with promoting a culture of empow-
erment, dissent or mobilisation. Working within such contradictory political 
models and ethos damages and contaminates Irish civil society actors, pushing 
them towards a personalist culture that encourages them to purposefully adopt 
a non-party political position. This leads to a type of politically neutralised and 
overly cordial civil society and a political culture that is an obstacle to dis-
senting political activity. This in turn leads not only to low levels of political 
party membership (Mair 2010), but the ‘need’ to be ‘non party’ can also be an 
excuse to self-censor party political or other political activity.4 Political neutral-
ity extends to avoiding influencing a person’s voting preference in referendums 
or general or local elections. It also militates against building alliances with 
progressive political parties, a key feature of progressive movement-building 
elsewhere (Silva 2009). Mair (2010: 3) laments a ‘moribund political culture’ 
symbolized by ‘a lack of room for new ideas and new political styles’.
Civil society organisations feel implicit or explicit restrictions on their free-
dom to take political positions in national debate (Kirby and Murphy 2009). The 
2010 Advocacy Initiative survey of the lobbying experience of Irish national 
level NGOs found that 86 per cent of respondents believe the environment for 
advocacy is becoming more challenging. Some 56 per cent of organisations 
said that they had not experienced threats because of advocacy work, but a 
substantial number report being threatened – or feeling threatened – because of 
their advocacy (Advocacy Initiative 2010: 7–10). While only one in nine NGOs 
reduced its advocacy due to ‘external factors’, instances of the state either cut-
ting or publicly threatening to cut NGO funding reinforces the likelihood of 
self-censorship in wider civil society. Populism permeates local state bureauc-
racy. Boyle (2005) describes how FÁS5 could act, with relative immunity from 
criticism, as a ‘mini Fianna Fail’ distributing its largesse through community 
employment schemes to ever loyal and subservient civil society organisations. 
Recent controversies also highlighted the political protection afforded to public 
agencies such as FÁS whose policies and practices enabled private actors in the 
market economy to also benefit from a patronage culture (CPAG 2009). Boyle 
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(2005: x) argues that critique of FÁS and dissent about its practices were ren-
dered ineffective in an Irish political culture that is ‘largely immune to research 
based critique’. Such a culture plays out most powerfully at a local level where 
organisations are more vulnerable and state–society relations more personal and 
localised. 
Co-option through corporatism 
Did the institutional design of Irish corporatism, which over the last two dec-
ades grew to incorporate a significant number of local and national civil society 
activists and organisations, give the state greater capacity to silence civil so-
ciety? McCashin (2004: 276) notes the strategic importance FF attaches to 
establishing links with trade unions, voluntary organisations and community 
groups and describes this ‘as a routine strategy of incorporation in a broad popu-
list agenda’. While often described as corporatism, Irish Social Partnership is a 
different animal to continental state corporatism. Adshead and Tonge describe 
the 1996 incorporation of the community and voluntary sector in partnership as 
a ‘poisoned chalice’ (2009: 139). While often reflected positively as a strength 
of interest groups in Ireland, participation in partnership has also been analysed 
as a state strategy to silence ideological debate or alternative political discourse 
(Meade 2005). The role social partners play in achieving and maintaining 
consensus also serves to depoliticise distributional debate. Civil society was 
effectively institutionally entrapped within the confines of social partnership. 
As Dryzek (1996) anticipated, where groups are assimilated in the state and 
dominated by a problem solving approach, they may promote a policy agenda, 
but are less likely to have a political agenda. Servicing partnership also meant a 
growing disconnection between practice-based work and policy work and local 
and national work, less prospect of facilitating voice or participative democracy 
and also neutered capacity for mobilisation and protest (Gaynor 2009a). 
State capture and control 
Over time, civil society capacity to be an effective driver of political change 
has been curtailed by state strategies to control or limit the development of the 
sector (McCashin 2004). The 2007 Task Force on Active Citizenship worked to 
shape civil society more towards volunteering than a more deliberative form of 
active citizenship (Cronin 2009; Gaynor 2009b), thus ‘depoliticizing its norma-
tive content’(Geoghegan and Powell 2007: 48). Harvey (2009) draws attention 
to legal, funding and organisational restructuring decisions which have curtailed 
civil society activity, limited advocacy, restricted groups to service delivery and 
cut funding for disadvantaged communities working to enable equal capacity 
for all to participate in civil society. Throughout the last decade there is grow-
ing critical awareness of the implications of too close a relationship with the 
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state. Powell and Geoghegan (2004) found incorporation to the state a double 
bind for community activists. With increased pressure from the state to restrict 
activity to service delivery, the potential of progressive civil society to enable a 
politicised form of active citizenship is reduced (Gaynor 2009b; Geoghegan and 
Powell 2009; Kirby and Murphy 2009; Kirby and Ó Broin 2009). Cox (2010: 
16–18) argues that an over focus on influencing the state led to partnership, pro-
fessionalisation and sectoralisation at the expense of popular mobilisation and 
structural capacity to engage in disruptive activity. Carnegie (2007) highlighted 
erosion of the public sphere, declining engagement in formal politics and mar-
ginalisation of dissent in both the UK and Ireland. Daly (2007: 10) commented 
on ‘heightened tensions’ between state and civil society actors which pose chal-
lenges for its capacity to realise progressive outcomes. 
Marketisation 
Ireland has shifted towards a competition state which prioritises goals of capital 
and economic competitiveness over citizen and societal welfare. In this rea-
lignment towards the market, power shifts from both state and society towards 
indigenous and international capital (Kirby and Murphy 2009). This marketi-
sation impacts on civil society in a number of ways. A shift to new public 
management practices has changed the practical working relationship between 
the state and civil society organisations with more use of service delivery con-
tracts, competitive tendering and bureaucratic managerial controls (Harvey 
2009). Some NGOs, more reliant on market funding conditions, have adapted 
their modus operandi to reflect a more business model of strategic planning. 
Privatisation policy has increased the range of public goods (housing, health, 
education, pensions and care) delivered through the market or through public-
private partnerships (Bissett 2009). Lynch (2006) stresses the degree to which 
neoliberalism and marketisation of higher education challenges the degree to 
which education can continue to serve the public good and civil society it is 
challenged to build solidarity and facilitate awareness of our interdependency. 
Increased concentration of multinational corporations’ ownership of media also 
weakens capacity to articulate and demonstrate dissent (Carnegie 2007). Crouch 
(2011) argues marketisation has moved the goalposts for civil society. Increased 
commodification and power of corporations mean both citizens and consumers 
are shifting their focus towards multinational corporations, as is evident for 
example in the Irish Shell to Sea campaign.6 
‘Stupidity is doing the same thing but expecting different results’ 
Civil society may not be as passive as it is perceived to be, but it has been 
largely ineffective in managing to promote debate about and mobilising support 
for alternatives. If civil society wants to increase capacity to create the good 
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society, what must it do differently? Hay (2004) argues that at critical junctures 
of crisis the interaction of three discrete independent political variables, ‘inter-
ests’, ‘institutions’ and ‘ideas’, will determine the pace and direction of political 
transition or change. The challenge is to strengthen Irish civil society interests, 
develop new institutions with capacity to publicly deliberate and build support 
for alternative ideas. Being effective requires a highly active society and partici-
pative citizenry able to articulate the type of state and market they want.
This means civil society needs to break free from entrapment within this 
pervasive political culture and reduce its reliance on a populist state. Civil so-
ciety actors face the challenge of reinventing themselves as interests capable of 
building capacity to articulate an alternative vision and developing alliances to 
promote that vision. The challenge for civil society is to shift the balance from 
working to deliver the state’s objectives (increased volunteering and service 
delivery) and developing public spheres from where citizens can participate 
in shaping the good society. This has been the goal of many groups for many 
years and over the crisis. Despite attempts to depoliticise communities, there 
is evidence of attempts to empower active citizenship (Gaynor 2009b). Many 
networks and emerging movements share a critical capacity and analysis, are 
developing a new sense of solidarity and exploring relationships between pro-
gressive civil society and left politics (Dillon 2011). 
Civil society actors need to take the offensive to define and shape their own 
vision within civil society. Instead of being trapped in state institutions that keep 
them in more micro problem-solving roles, Irish civil society needs to create 
institutions or new public spheres to mobilise public dialogue. This is consistent 
with calls for a ‘project of projects’ (Geoghegan and Powell 2007) and for ‘a 
national conversation outside the state’ (Cox 2010: 28). Daly (2007) and Silva 
(2009) advise working cross-sectorally to build links between largely separate 
spheres of civil society and accepting the inevitable tensions and contradictions 
between different tactics and models. This is difficult, but there is evidence of 
civil society attempting to mobilise around building public spheres. One at-
tempt to do this was the Claiming Our Future7 event in Dublin’s RDS on 30 
October 2010 where more than 1,000 people from diverse backgrounds and sec-
tors worked to articulate values and build progressive alliances for a more equal 
sustainable Ireland. Information technology-led strategies have created many 
new public spheres and successfully created virtual forums for debate. There is 
the danger, however, that new public spheres can perpetuate existing class and 
gender inequalities. Bua (2009: 9) warns that as long as entrenched structural 
inequalities remain unchallenged in modern society, new deliberative methods 
and modes of democracy will remain corrupted and unequal. 
The failure of the Irish state to assert its own values left it subservient, firstly 
to the power and ideology of oppressive civil society in the form of the Catholic 
Church and, more recently, to the power and ideology of global capital. Irish 
active society, if it is to be effective, needs to shed its cloak of neutral discourse 
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and acknowledge its values, ideas or ideological content. Smith (1998: 7) argues 
that ‘political struggle does nevertheless depend in part on the ability to imagine 
alternative worlds’. The Irish Occupy Dame Street movement which began in 
October 2011 is evidence of this type of imagination and struggle in Ireland.8 
Irish civil society is challenged to foster new language, to move away from 
internal, insular policy language and towards more accessible language used in 
everyday life and political discourse (Cox 2010: 21). Academics, particularly so-
ciologists, need to enhance their public role in the battle of ideas. Marketisation 
of education makes this challenge all the more difficult, but also all the more 
necessary. Education remains the key tool through which society can challenge 
the production and propagation of ideas through the market-driven mainstream 
media (Lynch 2006).
Conclusion: from where a more active society? 
Edward’s (2005: 6 ) hope for civil society is that it can be a counter weight to 
individualism, an antidote to cynicism and a balance to state and market power. 
In a Polanyian perspective in a time of crisis, we expect civil society to provide 
alternative ideas and societal pressure to force the state to embed the economy 
to serve the interests of society. The Irish crisis has not triggered a societal reac-
tion like Polanyi’s ‘double movement’. Culture often predates institutions, but 
institutions can embed culture. Low levels of confidence in political institutions 
may partially explain the absence of a more active response to the crisis, but 
Irish response to crisis also has to be understood in the shadow of a populist 
state where active society is institutionally trapped. Conflict, discourse and ide-
ological debate are all discouraged in an apparently homogeneous population 
‘united in the national interest’. An absence of ideology and ideas, conflict and 
political dynamic, public discourse and solidarity manifests itself in a relatively 
weak progressive civil society. Over the last decade various state-initiated insti-
tutional reforms aimed at disabling and muting progressive civil society. This 
process has now intensified over the recession. Less NGO funding and more 
state control over that funding shifts the challenge for building an active society 
from NGOs to active citizens. Irish history and examples from Latin America 
show civil society can successfully shape macro national development. This is 
more likely to happen when progressive groups work in solidarity and avoid 
state and market attempts to build divisions between them. 
The Irish state is a young state. A 2011 ‘Constitutional Convention’ will focus 
the public mind on debates about political reform, and centenary celebrations in 
20169 and 202210 will be occasions for national reflection. Debates about reform 
need to be driven by a clear sense of values and an ambition about what kind of 
society people want. This debate has so far been dominated by political, busi-
ness, media and academic elites. How will progressive civil society influence 
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this debate? Does it have ideas and alternatives? How can it make its voice 
heard in a way that does not perpetuate existing inequalities? 
Notes
 1 Fianna Fáil is one of the major Irish political parties, founded by de Valera in 1926 
as a republican party. It had its roots in its anti-treaty position in the 1922–23 civil 
war and developed a cross-class national movement as much as a political party. A 
key institution, it dominated the Irish state and held power for 80 per cent of the last 
sixty years where it adopted a brokerage and populist style of politics (Mair 1992).
 2 The Irish civil war (1922–23) followed the War of Independence when the country 
divided into opposing positions about accepting the Anglo Irish Treaty. The civil 
war legacy structured Irish politics into a pro-treaty (Fine Gael party) and anti-
treaty (Fianna Fáil party). This cleavage dominated constitutional politics.
 3 PRSTV is an electoral system which aims to achieve Proportional Representation, 
through a system where the voter has a Single Transferable Vote which they allocate 
in order of preference to as many candidates as they wish. In multi-seat constituen-
cies, the vote passes on in order until it elects someone.
 4 The exception is some trade unions who, influenced by British civil society tradi-
tion, align themselves with left or social democratic parties.
 5 FÁS (An Foras Áiseanna Saothair) is a national government agency with a regional 
and local office infrastructure responsible for delivering national and local training, 
labour market and employment services.
 6 Shell to Sea is a group organised to protest against the Corrib Gas Project, directed 
by a consortium of companies led by Royal Dutch Shell. The proposed offshore 
natural gas project is the Corrib field in the north-west coastal area of Ireland. The 
campaign began in 2001. 
 7 Claiming Our Future is an initiative of a number of non-government organisations 
and individuals who work together locally and nationally to promote values of 
equality, sustainability, accountability, solidarity and participation and to build a 
progressive movement for an equal, sustainable and thriving Ireland.
 8 Occupy Dame Street is a people’s movement, similar to Occupy Wall Street and up              
to 1,000 sister occupations in an evolving global solidarity movement. A non-vio-
lent leaderless resistance movement, it is a diverse people’s initiative, unaffiliated 
with any political parties and standing against political and economic corruption 
and for equality and social justice. 
 9 The Easter Rising of Irish republicans against British rule in Ireland began on 24 
April 1916 and ended 30 April 1916.
10 The Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed in January 1922 which led to the establishment 
of the Irish Republic and precipitated the Irish Civil War in the same year.
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